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) 
) 
) 
) 
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husband and wife, and GLEN ) 
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LIEN OR INTEREST IN THE ) 
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) 
) 
) 
Case No. 16642 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment 
entered by Calvin Gould dated the 15th day of June, 1979, 
denying the plaintiff a permanent restraining order. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court refused to grant the plaintiff a per-
manent restraining order and entered an order holding that 
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the plaintiffs' property was burdened with a thirty-three 
(33) foot right-of-way in favor of the defendants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents seek to have this Court affirm the 
judgment of Judge Gould. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs-appellants, Richard Diamond and his 
wife, Peggy Diamond, purchased a parcel of real property 
located in Pleasant View, Utah, sometime in 1968. The 
parcel was located on the south immediately adjacent to a 
roadway extending from a road known as 900 west in Pleasant 
View, running to the east to the property owned by the 
respondents. 
Subsequently the plaintiffs-appellants purchased an 
additional parcel of property this time located on the north 
side of the roadway extending to the respondents' property. 
That parcel was acquired in approximately 1975 (T99) . 
The roadway was not owned by the respondents but was 
donated for the construction of the roadway extending from 
900 West in Pleasant View to the respondents' property to 
the east prior to 1926. 
After the appellants acquired the property, Mr. Diamond 
caused the fence on the north side of the first parcel he 
purchased, to be rebuilt and in the process of rebuilding 
the fence, he moved to the north (T224) making the roadway 
much narrower. At the time the appellant moved hi' fence'' j 
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into the roadway, although the respondents did not tear it 
down, or file a lawsuit, they did talk to him about it. 
(T238) 
Subsequently when Mr. Diamond, the appellant, bought 
the property to the north of the roadway he began changing 
the location of the fence on the south side of the land. He 
was installing the fence poles to the south of the fence 
line thereby narrowing the roadway from the north. At that 
time the respondents simply removed the fence posts and it 
was the removal of the posts that caused the plaintiffs-
appellants to file their action for temporary restraining 
order. 
The issues that were presented to the trial court for 
determination were: 
(1) When was the roadway constructed? 
(2) What was the width of the roadway? 
(3) What is the width of the roadway to which the 
respondents are entitled? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
ROADWAY WAS CONSTRUCTED THIRTY-THREE (33) 
FEET IN WIDTH IN CALENDAR YEAR 1926. 
There were few witnesses available to testify with any 
degree of accuracy as to what occurred in 1927, however 
there is a living witness to the building of the road, Mr. 
Lucien v. Critchlow. At the time of trial he was 80 years 
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&].El ans testified that he knew the father of the defendants 
uui that he was familiar with the real property in question 
ilil the lawsuit. He testified that Ray Christofferson, 
~e;r of the respondents, hired him to maintain the lane by 
~lir.L! reeks, filling it with dirt, etc. (Tl76) and testi-
~iea taat he even built the fence. He testified that he 
ia,.eip,e:61. bl.lila the roadway in question in the year 1926 and 
¥@.'5pa.id 17 or 1S cents an hour .. (Tl78) 
'il'rh!.ere WilS SUBStantial discussion at that point in the 
~al ilS to the admissibility of Mr. Critchlow' s testimony 
~erlilinq the width of the road. Defendants' counsel asked 
*· Critchlow, "Give us your best estimate as to the width 
H tJue read that you built?" (Tl82) Plaintiffs' counsel 
oajected. The Court then stated, "He was there and he built 
tb.e roaa, and he can give me a judgment. It may go to the 
weight but it is certainly not inadmissible." The question 
wias asked, "In you best estimate Mr. Critchlow, how wide 
was the road you built?" Answer, "Well I think it was two 
rods." Question, "Do you know how far - how big two rods 
are?" To which he responded, "Yes. It is thirty-three 
feet." Question, "And did the road appear to you to be 
thirty-three feet in width?" Answer, "Yes it did." (Tl82) 
Mr. Mac Wade, a long time resident of the area and an 
owner of property immediately adjacent to the roadway, 
testified that he moved into the neighborhood in 1932 and 
when asked hfs opinion as to the distance between the fences 
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on the north and south side of the roadway he stated, "Well, 
I would just guess thirty-two feet to two rods. I would 
just guess, because I never measured it." (Tl99) And when 
asked, "What is your best estimate as to the width of that 
road?" he responded, "Thirty-three feet." (T200) 
Mr. Glen R. Christofferson, one of the respondents, 
testified he lived in the family home on the east end of 
that roadway in 1925. (T223) He testified that in 1946 or 
1947 that they were going to remove the family home down the 
roadway, that the house was 24 feet by 30 feet so he measurea 
the distance between telephone poles down along the road to 
see whether there would be adequate clearance. (T227) 
There was 31 feet between the posts. He further testified 
that on the north side of the road, the fence was about two 
feet north of the existing telephone poles. He further 
stated, "I remember when the power company installed those 
poles in 1931. At that time, when they dug the holes, they 
I 
was tamping it in, they didn't put it in the fence line." 
The question was asked, "They put it in which direction frem 
the fence?" to which he responded, "They put the poles 
inside the lane." The question was then asked, "Now, you 
say you measured the distance between the telephone poles on 
the north and the fence line on the south. How much distance 
was there?" to which he responded, "From the telephone pole 
to the south fence the line was 31 feet." (T228) 
rhereafter the Court concluded in his memorandum 
decision that the road was thirty-three feet in width and 
that it was constructed in 1926. Counsel had consistently 
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taken issue with that finding but it is clearly the testi-
mony of the only person there and he was not speculating or 
guessing, that was his best judgment and he also testified 
that that is what the adjoining property owners wanted, a 
thirty-three foot road. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO A PRESUMPTION 
'nlAT THEIR USE OF THE ROADWAY AT THIRTY-THREE 
(33) FEET WAS ADVERSE TO THE OWNER. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Richins vs. Struhs, 17 Utah 
2nd 356, 412 P.2nd, 314 clearly establishes where the Defend 
have shown that such use existed peaceably without inter-
ferertce for 20 years, that the law presumes that its use 
was adverse to the owner and that it had a legitimate origin. 
The court said, 
"The origin and purpose of their recognition 
rises out of the general policy of the law 
of assuring the peace and good order of 
society by leaving a long established status quo 
at rest rather than by disturbing it. In order to 
serve this purpose, when a claimant has shown t~ 
such a use has existed peaceably and without 
interference for the prescriptive period of 20 
years, the law presumes that the use is adverseJQ. 
the owner; and that it had a legitimate origin. 
The latter presumption is usually placed on the 
ground that there was a lawful grant of such 
right, but that it had been fictional. But the 
theory upon which the presumption rests is not 
important. Whatever theor :;_~ may be based u on, 
what is signi icant is in conformity with the 
t i§.t it has a well 'ustified and salutar pur ose 
w ich is in conformit with the well establish~ 
in our law that its validity is no lon~er open to 
question. Consequentl¥ it should be given ef!BI 
to prevent the very thing which defen~ants.ha~ 
attempted here: the upsetting of a situation 
which has existed amicabl since "the memor of 
man runne not to t e contrary. 
(Emphasis added) . 
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The Appellants here have misinterpreted the law, it is 
not the burden of the Respondents here to establish the 
prescriptive use by clear and convincing evidence, they have 
a presumption that it is legitimate. It is up to the 
Plaintiff to overcome the presumption by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE WHATEVER THAT THE RESPONDENTS 
HAVE ABANDONED THEIR PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT OF WAY. 
Subsequent to the construction of the roadway in 1926, 
the roadway was narrowed from the south lot by Joe Alkema 
in 1942. (T211) This was the testimony of Mac Wade, who 
was the owner of the property on the other side of the road. 
At the time Joe narrowed the roadway the Defendants spoke to 
him about it but did not attempt to tear up his fence. 
(T245) 
Each time the roadway was diminished in width, because 
of the moving of the fences, the Defendants objected to it. 
In approximately 1957, Royal Buce, the owner of the parcel 
to the south of the road, put in a new fence which narrowed 
the roadway and again the Defendants talked to him about it 
and voiced their objection. (T237) 
In 1968 when Diamond purchased the property and moved 
the fence into the roadway again the Defendants registered 
their complaint with him, but Diamond ignored them. (T246) 
In 1978 when Diamond started to install the fenceposts on 
the north side of the roadway, thereby diminishing the width 
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from the north, the Defendants had enough and pulled the 
fenceposts out which gave rise to this action. 
The Appellants have attempted to show that during a 
period of time, commencing in 1957, a Mr. Keith Hansen 
surveyed the area for Pleasant View Culinary Water Associa-
tion that the distance between the fences was 19 feet on one 
end of the road and 21 feet on the other and have therefore 
concluded that the Respondents have abandoned their easement. 
This is not a correct statement of the law. The law is 
clearly enunciated in Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 559 
P.2d 948, where the Court said at page 949, 
"A right-of-way by prescription is 
established by open, notorious, adverse use 
thereof for a period of twenty years. Once the 
adverse use is established for the twenty-year 
period, the burden of showing that it was not 
adverse is upon the owner of the servient estate." 
and the Court continued: 
'"If a twenty-year adverse use was established 
then that could only be defeated by a pro-
hibition of use for a like period." 
(Emphasis added) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has spoken on the question of 
abandonment in Western Gateway Storage Company vs. Treseder, 
567 P.2d, 181, where the Court said at page 182: 
"It is well recognized that an ease-
ment or right of way may be abandoned. 
However, to determine the issue of abandonment 
several factors need be considered among which 
whether or not the right was acquired by pre-
scription or grant, the extent of its use, and 
actual intent of the owner. 
are 
the 
"This Court has previously recognized that a right 
gained by conveyance may not be lost by non-use 
alone and that an actual intent to abandon be 
evident. The same principle was reaffirmed in Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Tuttle v. Sowadzki and fn Riter v. Cayias. 
"In regard to the quantum of proof required on the 
issue of abandonment, the court was confronted 
with the question in connection with a prescrip-
tive easement in Harmon v. Rasmussen and it was 
therein determined that the degree of eroof 
required was that of clear and convincing actions 
releasing the ownership and right of use and an 
intentional abandonment, not a mere re onderance 
of the evidence.' Emphasis adde 
There is no evidence here that the easement was abandoned, 
in fact quite the contrary, when the Appellants narrowed 
the roadway by moving the fence line of the south property 
to the north, the Respondents objected, the Appellants 
apparently ignored their pleas, but in 1978 when the Appellants 
again attempted to narrow the roadway from the north, the 
Respondents forcibly removed the posts, and it was that act 
which precipitated the lawsuit. 
If the testimony of Mr. Keith Hansen were true, it 
places the width of the road at 19 feet to 21 feet in 1957. 
There was no evidence concerning the width at 21 feet or 19 
feet at any time prior to 1957. And in 1968, the Respondents 
objected to the narrowing of the roadway, hence there is no 
showing that the roadway was diminished in width for the 
requisite 20 years. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court had an opportunity to hear numerous witnesses 
involved with the construction and operation of the roadway 
in question. He heard Mr. Critchlow, who is now 80 years 
old but had a specific recollection of the construction of Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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that road -- he helped build it, he knew how wide it was, 
a<mG it was 2 rods in width. 
He heard Mac Wade, who became a property owner of the 
adjacent property in 1932 and Mr. Wade testified that he too 
l9elieved that the property was 2 rods in width. The testimony 
of the :Respondents was consistent. 
The Court heard witnesses testify that property owners 
p;r.ior to »r. Diamol'l.d had attempted to narrow the roadway by 
mevbl·"!J the fence from the south parcel to the north, and 
frelll the north parcel to the south, and on each occasion 
t.aey oJi>jected to the narrowing of the roadway. The Court saw 
ola fence posts and old barb wire marks on trees close to 
the roadway. He saw photographs and heard oral testimony as 
to the location of the old fences. He obviously believed 
the witnesses and considered the physical evidence he saw to 
be consistent with that testimony. There was nothing 
difficult about the Court's conclusion that the roadway was 
indeed 2 rods in width. 
Mr. Diamond did not become an owner of the adjacent 
property until 1968 and immediately thereafter encroached 
further into the roadway from the south and met objections 
from the respondents. When he attempted to encroach into 
the roadway from the north, the respondents had had enough. 
They then tore the fence posts out, which gave rise to the 
lawsuit. 
By no stretch of the imagination could the Court have 
concluded that the roadway was any less than 2 rods in Wl . dth j Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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or that the respondents here had in someway acquiesced in 
the narrowing of the roadway or abandoned their right of 
way. The respondents had been there for a long time; it was 
the appellant who was the newcomer and who wanted to change 
the old fence lines to increase the size of his parcels of 
property. 
The Court's decision was logical and it was fair and it 
ought to be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted this 
Attorne or Defendants 
R pendents 
3918 Riverdale Road 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: 621-4430 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies 
of the foreqoinq Brief of Respondents were mailed to ~9-Pert 
~~h~~~~h~ti~~g~Y for Plaintiffs~~~ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
